Rule 803. Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay—Regardless of Whether the Declarant is Available as a Witness

The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness:

(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it.

(2) Excited utterance . A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.

(3) Then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent, or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant's will.

(4) Statement made for medical diagnosis or treatment. A statement that:

(A) Is made for—and is reasonably pertinent to—medical diagnosis or treatment; and

(B) Describes medical history; past or present symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their general cause.

(5) Recorded recollection . A record that:

(A) Is on a matter the witness once knew about but now cannot recall well enough to testify fully and accurately;

(B) Was made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness's memory; and

(C) Accurately reflects the witness's knowledge. If admitted, the record may be read into evidence but may be received as an exhibit only if offered by an adverse party.

(6) Records of a regularly conducted activity. A record of an act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis if:

(A) The record was made at or near the time by—or from information transmitted by—someone with knowledge;

(B) The record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit;

(C) Making the record was a regular practice of that activity;

(D) All these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or another qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12) or with a statute permitting certification; and

(E) The opponent does not show that the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.

(7) Absence of a record of a regularly conducted activity. Evidence that a matter is not included in a record described in paragraph (6) if:

(A) The evidence is admitted to prove that the matter did not occur or exist;

(B) A record was regularly kept for a matter of that kind; and

(C) Neither the possible source of the information nor other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.

(8) Public records . A record or statement of a public office if: (A ) It sets out:

(i) The office's regularly conducted and regularly recorded activities;

(ii) A matter observed while under a legal duty to report; or

(iii) Factual findings from a legally authorized investigation.

(B) The following are not within this exception to the hearsay rule:

(i) Investigative reports by police and other law enforcement personnel;

(ii) Investigative reports prepared by or for a government, a public office or an agency when offered by it in a case in which it is a party;

(iii) Factual findings offered by the state in a criminal case;

(iv) Factual findings resulting from special investigation of a particular complaint, case, or incident; and

(v) Any matter as to which the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.

(9) Public records of vital statistics. A record of a birth, death, or marriage, if reported to a public office in accordance with a legal duty.

(10) Absence of a public record. Testimony—or a certification under Rule 902—that a diligent search failed to disclose a public record or statement if the testimony or certification is admitted to prove that:

(A) The record or statement does not exist; or

(B) A matter did not occur or exist, if a public office regularly kept a record or statement for a matter of that kind.

(11) Records of religious organizations concerning personal or family history. A statement of birth, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage, divorce, death, relationship by blood or marriage, or similar facts of personal or family history, contained in a regularly kept record of a religious organization.

(12) Certificates of marriage, baptism, and similar ceremonies. A statement of fact contained in a certificate:

(A) Made by a person who is authorized by a religious organization or by law to perform the act certified;

(B) Attesting that the person performed a marriage or similar ceremony or administered a sacrament; and

(C) Purporting to have been issued at the time of the act or within a reasonable time after it.

(13) Family records. A statement of fact about personal or family history contained in a family record, such as a Bible, genealogy, chart, engraving on a ring, inscription on a portrait, or engraving on an urn or burial marker.

(14) Records of documents that affect an interest in property. The record of a document that purports to establish or affect an interest in property if:

(A) The record is admitted to prove the content of the original recorded document, along with its signing and its delivery by each person who purports to have signed it;

(B) The record is kept in a public office; and

(C) A statute authorizes recording documents of that kind in that office.

(15) RESERVED.

(16) Statements in ancient documents. A statement in a document that is at least 20 years old and whose authenticity is established.

(17) Market reports and similar commercial publications. Market quotations, lists, directories, or other compilations that are generally relied on by the public or by persons in particular occupations.

(18) Statements in learned treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets. A statement contained in a treatise, periodical, or pamphlet if:

(A) The statement is called to the attention of an expert witness on cross-examination; and

(B) The publication is established as a reliable authority by the expert's admission or testimony, by another expert's testimony, or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statement may be read into evidence but not received as an exhibit.

(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. A reputation among a person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage—or among the person's associates or in the community—concerning the person's birth, adoption, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage, divorce, death, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, or similar facts of the person's personal or family history.

(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. A reputation in a community—arising before the controversy—concerning boundaries of land in the community or customs that affect the land, or concerning general historical events important to that community, state, or nation.

(21) Reputation concerning character. A reputation among a person's associates or in the community concerning the person's character.

(22) Judgment of a previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment of conviction if:

(A) The judgment was entered after a trial or guilty plea;

(B) The conviction was for a crime punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than a year;

(C) The evidence is admitted to prove any fact essential to the judgment; and

(D) When offered by the prosecutor in a criminal case for a purpose other than impeachment, the judgment was against the defendant.

(23) Judgments involving personal, family, or general history, or a boundary. A judgment that is admitted to prove a matter of personal, family, or general history, or boundaries, if the matter:

(A) Was essential to the judgment; and

(B) Could be proved by evidence of reputation.

Committee Notes

Advisory Committee Note – August 2018 This amendment revises subdivision (6) of Rule 803 to follow a corresponding 2014 amendment to Federal Rules of Evidence 803(6) and to clarify that, while the proponent has the burden of establishing the foundational elements listed in sections (A)–(D), the proponent need not initially show that the source of information or circumstances of its preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness. It is up to the opponent to show that the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation of the record indicate a lack of trustworthiness. This is not a substantive change. In practice, parties and courts seem to have assumed that the language "neither the source of information nor the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness" in existing Rule 803(6) meant that the burden of demonstrating these contrary indications is with the opponent. Although this proviso has been applied in cases reviewed by the Law Court, see, e.g. , Adamatic v. Progressive Baking Co., Inc. , 667 A.2d 871 (Me. 1995), there are no known Law Court decisions discussing which party has either the burden of going forward or the risk of nonpersuasion. The Advisory Committee Note to the 2014 Federal 803(6) amendment states: The Rule has been amended to clarify that if the proponent has established the stated requirements of the exception—regular business with regularly kept record, source with personal knowledge, record made timely, and foundation testimony or certification—then the burden is on the opponent to show that the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness. While most courts have imposed that burden on the opponent, some have not. It is appropriate to impose this burden on the opponent, as the basic admissibility requirements are sufficient to establish a presumption that the record is reliable. The opponent, to meet its burden, is not necessarily required to introduce affirmative evidence of untrustworthiness. For example, the opponent might argue that a record was prepared in anticipation of litigation and is favorable to the preparing party without needing to introduce evidence on the point. A determination of untrustworthiness necessarily depends on the circumstances. If lack of trustworthiness of a proffered business record is asserted by an opposing party on voir dire , by the proffer of evidence, or by argument, the court can take into account the parties' relative access to information in determining whether the objecting party has carried its burden of showing lack of trustworthiness.

Maine Restyling Note [November 2014] Restyled Rule 803 preserves the substantive differences between the Maine and the Federal Rules. Maine does not have any residual hearsay exception.

Advisers' Note to former M.R. Evid. 803 (February 2, 1976) The framework of this and the following rule is to separate statements made by a declarant even though he is available as a witness from those made by a declarant who is unavailable. For the most part, the exceptions in this rule from the prohibition against hearsay evidence are those evolved on a case-by-case basis by the common law and presently recognized in Maine. The differences will be discussed under the separate subdivisions. Subdivisions (1) and (2) overlap somewhat, although they are based on different theories. The theory of (1) is that a statement substantially contemporaneous to the event being described is most unlikely to be a deliberate or conscious misrepresentation. There is no requirement that the event be an exciting one, although it usually will be, since unexciting events are not likely to evoke comment. The theory of (2) is that witnessing a startling event produces a state of excitement which for the time being stills the reflective faculties and negatives a purpose to fabricate evidence. It differs from (1) in that a greater lapse of time is allowable. The crucial question is how long the state of excitement may be found to last. This is a preliminary question for the judge. The principle is well established by Maine case law. See State v. Ellis, 297 A.2d 91 (Me. 1972), where admissibility was denied, and State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647 (Me. 1973), where the statements were admitted. Subdivision (3) makes admissible statements of the declarant's then existing state of mind, such as intent, plan, motive, and the like. The principle is illustrated by Maine cases. Colby v. Tarr, 139 Me. 277, 29 A.2d 749 (1943); State v. Trask, 223 A.2d 823, 826 (Me. 1966). The rule excludes in general statements of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed. This, as the Federal Advisory Committee said, is necessary to avoid the virtual destruction of the hearsay rule which would result from allowing state of mind, provable by an out-of-court statement, to serve as a basis for inference of the happening of the event which produced the state of mind. A prime example of this danger is Shepard v. United States, 290 U. S. 96, 54 S.Ct. 22 (1933). There the statement that "Dr. Shepard has poisoned me" was held inadmissible despite the argument that it showed the victim's state of mind— a will to live—in order to rebut evidence of intent to commit suicide. It preserves the result in the notorious case of Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 12 S.Ct. 909 (1892), where a letter from one Walters that he intended to go to Crooked Creek with Hillmon was held admissible, his statement of present intent making it more probable that he went and went with Hillmon. A statement of then existing state of mind eliminates the memory risk inherent in a statement reflecting a past state of mind. The subdivision also removes from the generalization excluding statements of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed statements relating to the execution, revocation, or identification of the terms of the declarant's will, thus making such statements admissible. The Federal Advisory Committee said that this represents an ad hoc judgment, resting on practical grounds of necessity and expediency rather than logic. This rule does not affect the Maine cases holding that oral testimony of the testator's intentions is inadmissible. Bryant v. Bryant, 129 Me. 251, 151 A. 429 (1930); First Portland Nat'l Bank v. Kaler-Vaill, 155 Me. 50, 151 A.2d 708 (1959). Subdivision (4) recognizes an exception to the hearsay rule statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment. Such statements are now admissible under Maine law, not as proof of the facts stated but only as they might support or explain the doctor's diagnosis or opinion. Goldstein v. Sklar, 216 A.2d 298 (Me. 1966). This subdivision admits the statements for their truth. The justification is the patient's strong motivation to be truthful. Furthermore, it is unrealistic to assume that the lay juror is capable of making the nice discrimination between admissibility for truth and for the other purposes allowable under present law. The words "insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment" are broad enough to cover statements as to the cause of an injury ("I was struck by a car") but not statements of fault ("The car went through a red light"). The statement need not have been made directly to a physician in order to be admissible, but would include statements to an ambulance driver, emergency room attendants (interns, nurses, orderlies and the like), or to members of the family. "Medical treatment" is not broad enough, however, to include a statement by a child to its mother for administration of a home remedy such as a dose of aspirin or soaking of a bruised hand. Subdivision (5) recognizes the familiar hearsay exception for past recollection recorded. Cope v. Sevigny, 289 A.2d 682 (Me. 1972). The rule is silent as to whether exhibits are to be sent to the jury room, thus giving the court the same discretion as at present. Customarily the written memorandum is not allowed to go to the jury room because it may impart "an aura of veracity and accuracy not normally attached to the spoken words." Morgan v. Paine, 312 A.2d 178, 185 (Me. 1973). Subdivision (6) covers the hearsay exception for records of a regularly conducted business. It gives somewhat broader coverage to business records than present Maine law. It would not admit personal check stubs, held inadmissible in Supruniuk v. Petriw, 334 A.2d 857 (Me. 1975), and like individual financial records nor a personal diary concerning daily weather conditions, regularly kept as a hobby, held inadmissible under the old "shopbook" rule in Arnold v. Hussey, 111 Me. 224, 88 A. 724 (1913). It should be noted that records not admissible under this exception may get in through some other route, such as admissions, statements against interest, past recollection recorded, and so on. Subdivision (7) is a necessary complement to subdivision (6). It provides that the absence of an entry is admissible to prove nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the matter. Compare M.R.C.P. 44(b), dealing with proof of lack of official record. Subdivision (8) creates a hearsay exception for various types of public records and reports. There is a common law exception for public records and there are numerous Maine statutes facilitating the admission of specified official records. This subdivision is largely a generalized statement of the provisions found in these statutes. The justification is the assumption, by no means an inevitable one, that a public official will perform his duties properly. There is an escape clause in (B)(v) providing for exclusion if there are circumstances indicating lack of trustworthiness. The corresponding Federal subdivision is substantially different in form and in some respects in substance also. The chief substantive difference is that the Federal Rule excludes from matters as to which there was a duty to report "[i]n criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel." Note, however, sub-paragraph (B) of the Maine rule, which excludes from this exception investigative reports by police and other law enforcement personnel. The formulation of the subdivision, which is taken from the Uniform State Law, seems more readily understandable. Subdivision (9) makes admissible records of vital statistics. It is written so that it is sufficient if the report is made to a public office pursuant to requirements of law (not necessarily by a public officer). Thus certificates of ministers or physicians are admissible. The subdivision does not make the record admissible as to cause of death. In this respect it is like 22 M.R.S.A. § 2707. Under Maine case law the certificate is not admissible for that purpose. Barton v. Beck's Estate, 159 Me. 446, 195 A.2d 63 (1963). Subdivision (10) is similar to subdivision (7) in permitting proof of nonoccurrence of an event by evidence of nonexistence of a public record that would ordinarily be made of its occurrence. Thus this mode of proof may be used in connection with matters referred to in subdivisions (8) and (9), just as can be done under subdivision (7) with respect to subdivision (6). Subdivision (11) may overlap somewhat subdivision (6). It makes admissible statements from records of churches and religious societies concerning births, marriages, divorces, deaths and other similar facts of personal or family history. Many of these could come in under the business records exception in subdivision (6). That subdivision, however, requires that any person supplying the recorded information have a duty to do so, thus following the leading case of Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930) (police report incorporating information obtained from a bystander inadmissible). The present subdivision does not include such a requirement, on the theory that there is every reason to repose trust in the data submitted to a religious organization, such as the age of a child for inclusion in a baptismal certificate. Subdivision (12) provides for admission of statements of fact in a marriage, baptismal, or similar certificate. It duplicates in part subdivision (8) for public records, but it is broader, including baptism and confirmation. It applies to the certificate given to the parties by the clergyman or like person who performs the ceremony. Subdivision (13) conforms to the traditional approach, making records of family history in Bibles and the like admissible. It covers inscriptions on family portraits, tombstones and other types of record, even though the author may not be identifiable. Subdivision (14) creates a hearsay exception for the record of a deed as proof of the content of the document and its execution and delivery. This is a slight change in Maine law. Under 16 M.R.S.A. § 452 an attested copy from the registry may be used in evidence without proof of execution when the party offering it is not the grantee in the deed, nor claiming as his heir, nor justifying as his agent. This subdivision makes such a record admissible without limitation. It is to be noted that the record is merely made admissible without giving it presumptive force. If there is a genuine controversy, more persuasive evidence should be sought. The Federal Rule contains a subdivision (15) recognizing a hearsay exception for statements in documents affecting an interest in property. The Court accepted subdivision (14) for the record of a document affecting an interest in property as proof of its content, execution, and delivery but declined to extend the exception to statements contained in such a document. Subdivision (16) makes admissible statements in a document in existence twenty years or more if its authenticity has been established. Authentication may be achieved by showing that a document is "ancient" pursuant to Rule 901(b)(8). But authentication does not resolve the question of admissibility of assertive statements in the document. A hearsay exception is also necessary, and this subdivision provides it. It also reduces the thirtyyear time period of the common law tradition, recognized in Landry v. Giguere, 128 Me. 382, 147 A. 816 (1929), to twenty years. Subdivision (17) creates an exception to the hearsay rule for market quotations, directories or other published compilations used and relied upon by the public or by persons in particular occupations. Maine now provides in 11 M.R.S.A. § 2-724, the Uniform Commercial Code, that when goods are traded in an established market, market reports in official publications, trade journals, or newspapers are admissible. There are decisions from other jurisdictions admitting stock market quotations, city directories, telephone directories, and the like. Subdivision (18) changes Maine law by making learned treatises called to an expert's attention on cross-examination and established as authoritative admissible as substantive evidence. Hitherto admission of a learned treatise over objection has been forbidden except to impeach an expert witness who relies upon such authority for the opinion he has expressed. Goldthwaite v. Sheraton Restaurant, 154 Me. 214, 145 A.2d 362 (1958). This subdivision, as in the case of other rules, implicitly accepts the proposition that jurors are unlikely to understand and follow limitations on the purpose for which evidence is admitted, such as the difference between use for impeachment and as substantive evidence. It is to be noted that the expert himself need not even recognize the treatise as authoritative so long as its authoritativeness is somehow established, such as by testimony of another expert or, conceivably, by judicial notice. Thus the possibility is avoided that the expert may block cross-examination by denying either reliance or authoritativeness. There is nothing in this subdivision to prevent the use for impeachment of any writing, authoritative or not, as can be done at present. The Federal Rule makes admissible a learned treatise relied upon by an expert on direct examination as well as one called to his attention upon crossexamination. It seems undesirable to allow an expert to bolster his direct testimony by use of a supporting treatise as substantive evidence. The

Federal Advisory Committee's statement that the chance of misunderstanding and misapplication of the treatise is avoided because the expert is on the stand and available to explain it is unimpressive. Subdivision (19) recognizes and broadens one of the oldest exceptions to the hearsay rule, evidence of reputation concerning personal or family history. Marriage has always been considered a proper subject of proof by evidence of community reputation, but there has been a split as to birth, death, legitimacy, adoption and relationship. This exception extends to all of these matters. The rule allows evidence of reputation in the community or among associates as well as in the family. The Federal Advisory Committee said: "This world [in which the reputation may exist] has proved capable of expanding with changing times from the single uncomplicated neighborhood, in which all activities take place, to the multiple and unrelated worlds of work, religious affiliation, and social activity, in each of which a reputation may be generated." The rule does not require that the declarations be made before the controversy leading to the litigation developed, nor is it necessary to show that the declarant is unavailable. It must be emphasized that reputation in the community means more than mere gossip. Subdivision (20) makes admissible evidence of reputation in a community, arising before the controversy, as to boundaries affecting lands in the community. It allows such evidence with respect to both public and private boundaries. This is the general rule in the United States, but Maine has limited its application to public boundaries. Chapman v. Twitchell, 37 Me. 59 (1853). The rule also admits reputation evidence as to matters of general history. This aspect of the rule is in accord with Maine law. Piper v. Voorhees, 130 Me. 305, 155 A. 556 (1931) (Maine Historical Society Map in the History of Scarborough admissible without extrinsic evidence of authenticity). Subdivision (21) makes admissible evidence of reputation of a person's character among his associates or in the community. This has long been the subject of a hearsay exception. This subdivision is merely a restatement, in the hearsay context, of Rule 405(a) which outlines the methods of proving character. Subdivision (22) makes evidence of a conviction of a crime punishable by imprisonment for one year or more admissible for the purpose of proving any fact essential to the judgment (but not a judgment against a person other than the accused when offered by the state to prove any such fact). The traditional rule denies admissibility, but there is no Maine case law on the point. There is an increasing tendency to hold a judgment of conviction of a crime conclusive against the accused in a subsequent civil case, as when a person convicted of arson seeks to recover on the fire insurance policy covering the burned property. This subdivision has nothing to do with this use of res judicata or collateral estoppel. However desirable it would be to have such a rule, it is a matter of substantive law beyond the scope of rules of evidence. Failing that, the half-way measure of making evidence of a conviction admissible but not conclusive seems desirable. Adoption of the subdivision should not be taken as foreclosing the Court from holding that res judicata principles make the conviction conclusive. Subdivision (23) makes admissible a prior judgment involving matters of personal, family or general history or boundaries, if the same would be provable by reputation evidence. It seems reasonable to conclude that the process of inquiry and scrutiny which is relied upon to render reputation reliable is present to as great or greater degree in the process of litigation. The number of cases dealing with the issue is very small. In the leading case, Patterson v. Gaines, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 550 (1848), a prior judgment of legitimacy was received as prima facie evidence in a later civil action. The Federal Rule contains a subdivision (24), a catch-all provision which would allow the court to admit evidence "having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" to the listed exceptions. This reflects the judgment of Congress that it is undesirable to freeze the hearsay exceptions so as to prevent the ordinary and rational development of the law of evidence without the necessity of amending the rules to respond to a situation which has arisen in a given trial. Such an amendment would of course be too late to affect the result of that trial. The rule as enacted by Congress plainly evinces concern lest too much uncertainty be injected in the law of evidence and a fear that trial judges would exercise in widely different ways their judgment as to what constituted "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." The rule incorporates safeguards designed to minimize this hazard. It requires a determination by the trial court that the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact, that it is more probative on the point than any other evidence reasonably available, and that the interests of justice will best be served by its admission. Moreover, notice of the intention to offer the statement must be given sufficiently in advance of trial to provide a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it. The notice must give the particulars of the statement, including the name and address of the declarant. The court will be expected to give the opponent a full and adequate opportunity to contest the admission of the statement. Moreover, the Senate Committee Report emphasized the exceptional nature of the use of the provision saying: "It is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances. The committee does not intend to establish a broad license for trial judges to admit hearsay statements that do not fall within one of the other exceptions contained in rules 803 and 804(b). The residual exceptions are not meant to authorize major judicial revisions of the hearsay rule, including its present exceptions." The Court decided not to adopt any catch-all provision. It was impressed by the theoretical undesirability of foreclosing further development of the law of evidence on a case-by-case basis. It concluded, however, that despite the purported safeguards, there was a serious risk that trial judges would differ greatly in applying the elastic standard of equivalent trustworthiness. The result would be a lack of uniformity which would make preparation for trial difficult. Nor would it be likely that the Law Court on appeal could effectively apply corrective measures. There would indeed be doubt whether an affirmance of an admission of evidence under the catch-all provision amounted to the creation of a new exception with the force of precedent or merely a refusal to rule that the trial judge had abused his discretion. Flexibility in construction of the rules so as to promote growth and development of the law of evidence is called for by Rule 102. Under this mandate there will be room to construe an existing hearsay exception broadly in the interest of ascertaining truth, as distinguished from creating an entirely new exception based upon the trial judge's determination of equivalent trustworthiness, a guideline which the most conscientious of judges would find extremely difficult to follow.

Advisory Committee Note (July 1, 2002 Amendment) These amendments are intended to ease the process of admission of records of regularly conducted activity covered by Rule 803(6). Rule 803(6) excepts from the Hearsay Rule records certified in accord with Rules 902(11) and 902(12). The new subsections of Rule 902 provide for certification of records of regularly conducted activity by domestic entities in both civil and criminal cases, and for certification of records of foreign entities in civil cases only. The certificate establishes the foundational facts required for admissibility under Rule 803(6). The new rules apply both to records of parties as well as records of non-party entities. The proposed amendment parallels a recent amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence. Like the Federal version, the Maine version requires advance notice of intention to offer evidence under this provision. The Maine version goes a little beyond the Federal version in expressly authorizing the trial court to decline to accept the certification in the interests of justice, thus requiring the party offering the certificate to provide the foundation by other evidence, in most cases testimony complying with Rule 803(6). To the extent feasible objection to a certified record must be made in a timely manner to permit the proponent opportunity to procure any necessary foundation testimony. For the purpose of this rule, the term "domestic" refers to the 50 United States of America, not just the State of Maine. A domestic record would be a record of an entity doing business in a domestic jurisdiction. The changes in the rules do not affect the scope of Rule 803(6), which is intended to cover records of entities and activities other than governmental records covered by Rule 803(8).