Rule 301. Presumptions in Civil Cases Generally

(a) Effect. In a civil case, unless a statute or these rules provide otherwise, the party against whom a presumption is directed has the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence.

(b) Prima facie evidence. A statute providing that a fact or group of facts is prima facie evidence of another fact establishes a presumption within the meaning of this rule.

(c) Conflicting presumptions. If two presumptions conflict with each other, the court must apply the presumption that is more strongly supported by policy and logic. If neither presumption is more strongly supported by policy and logic, both presumptions must be disregarded.

Committee Notes

Maine Restyling Note [November 2014] Maine Rule 301 is quite different from Federal Rule 301, in that the effect of a presumption is different and there are additional provisions dealing with the phrase "prima facie evidence" and conflicting presumptions. The proposed restyled Rule attempts to retain these distinctions in restyled format and language.

Federal Advisory Committee Note The language of Rule 301 has been amended as part of the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility.

Advisers' Note to former M.R. Evid. 301 (February 2, 1976) The problems in dealing with presumptions are complex and difficult. First of all, the term has been used in very different senses by courts and legislatures. The generally prevailing view among the commentators is that the word presumption should be reserved for the convention that when a designated fact called the basic fact exists, another fact called the presumed fact must be taken to exist in the absence of adequate rebuttal. It has that meaning in this rule. Laymen, and courts as well, frequently use it as a synonym for "inference" ("Dr. Livingston, I presume"), a matter of logic and experience, not of law. The trier of fact is free to adopt or reject the inference. The phrase "conclusive presumption" is not a presumption in any useful sense, but a rule of law that if one fact, the basic fact, is proved, no one will be heard to say that another fact, the presumed fact, does not exist. Nor is the "presumption of innocence" in criminal cases really a presumption at all, but rather a forceful way of saying that the prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that there is to be no inference against the defendant because of his arrest, indictment, or presence in the dock. Giving presumption the meaning stated, if the only evidence relates to B, the basic fact, it is universally conceded that when B is established, P, the presumed fact, has to be taken as true. The trouble begins when evidence that P is not true is introduced. One view, still followed in the majority of states, is that the presumption places on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence but that when there is testimony to support a finding of the nonexistence of the presumed fact, the presumption disappears like a bursting bubble and the case proceeds as though there never had been a presumption. Another view is that the presumption continues despite contradictory evidence, and the burden of persuasion is shifted so that the party against whom the presumption is directed must show that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence. This rule adopts for civil actions the second of these views and shifts the burden of persuasion to the party against whom the presumption operates. This is a change in Maine law as enunciated in the landmark opinion by Justice Webber in Hinds v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 155 Me. 349, 155 A.2d 721 (1959), where the Law Court took the position that a presumption persists "until the contrary evidence persuades the factfinder that the balance of probabilities is in equilibrium, or, stated otherwise, until the evidence satisfies the jury or factfinder that it is as probable that the presumed fact does not exist as that it does exist." The Hinds rule appears to have worked with reasonable satisfaction, but there have been difficulties in explaining to the jury the concept of probabilities being in equilibrium. Moreover, it involves the logical impossibility of treating a presumption as evidence to be balanced against other evidence when it is not evidence at all but a rule about evidence. The difficulties with the Hinds rule are enhanced because it does not take into account the different types of presumptions. Most presumptions are grounded upon an inference; that is, a deduction of fact that may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts. Evidence of these underlying facts can be balanced against evidence of contrary facts. It is not helpful, however, to say that the presumption persists to the point of equilibrium. On the other hand, some presumptions are not based upon rational inference but are created to reflect a desirable policy. An example is the presumption that goods received by the terminal carrier were in the same condition as, when delivered to the initial carrier. See Ross v. Maine Central R.R., 114 Me. 287, 96 A. 223 (1915). Here there is nothing to balance against evidence that the goods came to the last carrier in damaged condition, and the Hinds rule is particularly ill-adapted to this situation. The Federal Rule limits the effect of a presumption to fixing the burden of going forward, so that the presumption disappears when evidence is introduced which would support a contrary finding. Thus the offering of testimony which no one in the courtroom believes serves to drop the presumption out of the case. This gives too little weight to presumptions, especially those not based on rational inference. In shifting the burden of persuasion this rule has the merit of making it unnecessary for the court ever to mention the presumption and making it possible to charge the jury in terms which it can readily understand. It may be thought to give too great an effect to some presumptions, but this seems preferable to the alternative of giving too little weight. In making its choice the Court has adopted the rule originally promulgated by the Supreme Court and incorporated in the newly approved Uniform State Law. It was also looked upon with favor in Justice Webber's opinion which finally settled upon the Hinds Rule. It should be noted that the rule preserves any statute giving a presumption a different effect. One such statute is the Uniform Commercial Code, 11 M.R.S.A. § 1-201(31), which defines a presumption in terms affecting only the burden of going forward. There are numerous statutes which state that one fact is prima facie evidence of another fact. The purpose of subdivision (b) is to make it clear that such a statute creates a presumption within the meaning of this rule in a civil case. Rule 303(a) is to the same effect in a criminal case. Subdivision (c) is designed to resolve the impasse when the court is confronted by inconsistent presumptions. It directs the application of the one founded upon weightier considerations of policy. If policy considerations are of equal weight, both presumptions are to be disregarded. The wording is taken from the Uniform Rules of Evidence approved in 1953 by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The principal class of cases in which the problem has arisen is where rights are asserted under a second marriage but no direct evidence is available of a death or divorce terminating the first marriage before the second. Most courts say the presumption of innocence or of the validity of a marriage is stronger than the presumption of continuance of life or continuance of marriage.