Rule 201. Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts

(a) Scope. This rule governs judicial notice of an adjudicative fact only, not a legislative fact.

(b) Kinds of facts that may be judicially noticed. The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it:

(1) Is generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or

(2) Can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.

(c) Taking notice. The court:

(1) May take judicial notice on its own; or

(2) Must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary information.

(d) Timing. The court may take judicial notice at any stage of the proceeding.

(e) Opportunity to be heard. On timely request, a party is entitled to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial notice and the nature of the fact to be noticed. If the court takes judicial notice before notifying a party, the party, on request, is still entitled to be heard.

(f) Instructing the jury. The court must instruct the jury to accept the noticed fact as conclusive.

Committee Notes

Maine Restyling Note [November 2014] Maine Rule 201 is similar, but not identical to Federal Rule 201. In Maine there is no distinction between civil and criminal cases in the effect of judicial notice. In both cases the court instructs the jury that the fact noticed should be accepted as conclusive. This policy choice has been carried over into the restyled Rule. See also 16 M.R.S. §§ 401-406 (addressing judicial notice of laws of other jurisdictions).

Federal Advisory Committee Note The language of Rule 201 has been amended as part of the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility.

Advisers' Note to former M.R. Evid. 201 (February 2, 1976) This rule applies only to judicial notice of "adjudicative facts" as distinguished from "legislative facts", a distinction which has caused some confusion. An adjudicative fact is the "what-happened", "who-did-what-andwhen" kind of question that normally goes to a jury. It seems reasonable to require, as the rule does, that a judicially noticed adjudicative fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute. Legislative facts are those a court takes into account in determining the constitutionality or interpretation of a statute or the extension or restriction of a common law rule upon grounds of policy. They will often hinge on social, economic, or political facts not generally known by intelligent people or readily determinable by resort to sources of unquestioned accuracy. Subdivision (a) excludes legislative facts from the operation of the rule. Subdivision (b) in stating the kinds of facts which can be judicially noticed is in accord with Maine case law. Torrey v. Congress Square Hotel Co., 145 Me. 234, 242, 75 A.2d 451, 457 (1950). There are many Maine cases allowing judicial notice of facts capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. See, e.g., First National Bank v. Kingsley, 84 Me. 111, 24 A. 794 (1891) (upon what day of the week a certain day of the month falls). Subdivisions (c) and (d) permit the court to take judicial notice without request and require proper judicial notice to be taken on request. Taking judicial notice without request reflects existing Maine practice, and it seems reasonable to require it in appropriate cases on request of a party. Subdivisions (e), (f), and (g) explain the procedural mechanics of judicial notice. As a matter of fairness, it assures a party of the right to be heard in opposition to the taking of judicial notice. At the hearing he can offer evidence and argument that the matter is reasonably subject to dispute. If he fails to convince the trial judge, his only remedy is by appeal. He cannot present contrary evidence to the jury because by hypothesis facts can be judicially noticed only if they are not subject to reasonable dispute. The court must instruct the jury to accept as established any judicially noticed fact. It would be absurd to allow jurors to consider, for example, on the basis of their individual recollection or speculation, whether December 4, 1972, actually fell on a Monday as the court had instructed them. The rule does not distinguish between civil and criminal cases. Most of the criminal cases deal with matters of jurisdiction or venue. State v. Bennett, 158 Me. 109, 116, 179 A.2d 812, 816 (1962) (judicial notice that Hope is in Knox County). But the rule is not so limited. The constitutional right to trial by jury does not extend to matters which are beyond reasonable dispute. For instance, the Law Court has taken judicial notice that alcohol is intoxicating and overruled an exception based on lack of proof of that fact. State v. Kelley, 129 Me. 8, 149 A. 153 (1930). Finally, this rule has nothing to do with judicial notice of foreign law, which is covered by 16 M.R.S.A. §§ 401–406 and M.R.C.P. 44A. The Federal Rule adds a sentence in subdivision (g) that in a criminal case the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially noted. Since judicial notice is limited to facts not subject to reasonable dispute, there is no reason for not making it mandatory in criminal as well as in civil cases. It would be absurd in a criminal case as in a civil action to allow jurors to question the accuracy of the court's instruction as to what day of the week December 4, 1972, actually was. It is essential to bear in mind that resort to judicial notice in any case, civil or criminal, is permissible only if the judicially noticed fact is not subject to reasonable dispute. The court must not accept as sufficient the absence of actual dispute over, for example, a scientific conclusion found in a text or treatise. Such a misuse of judicial notice would deprive a criminal defendant of his constitutional right to jury trial. ARTICLE III. PRESUMPTIONS