Rule 1C. Signatures

(a) Form of signature. Where a signature is required on any document filed with the Clerk of the Law Court, a person may sign the document by using one of the following methods:

(1) Physically signing the document;

(2) Embedding in the document an image of the person's physical signature; or

(3) Typing "/s/" followed by the person's name, all on the signature line.

(b) Signature block to follow signature. Every person who signs a document must include a signature block immediately below that person's signature. A signature block must include the following:

(1) The person's printed name;

(2) The person's mailing address;

(3) The person's email address, if any; and

(4) If the person is an attorney,

(A) the attorney's Maine bar number,

(B) the attorney's law office or firm name, if any,

(C) the attorney's telephone number, and

(D) the name of each party on whose behalf the document is filed.

(c) Effect of signature . A person's signature on a document constitutes a representation that the document, together with any associated exhibits or other documents, is filed in good faith and conforms to the page or word limits and the form and formatting requirements of the applicable rule or rules.

(d) Authenticity of signature. The filing of a document constitutes a representation by the person actually filing the document that each signature on the document is authorized by the person whose signature it purports to be. If a party has a good-faith basis to believe that an image or typed signature was not authorized by the person whose signature appears on a document, the party challenging the signature may file a motion with the Court. If the Court determines that there is a substantial possibility that the signature was not authorized by the person whose signature it purports to be, the Court may strike the challenged document, direct that the challenged document be filed and served again with an original handwritten signature, or impose any other requirement it deems necessary.

Committee Notes

Advisory Committee Note – July 2022 Rule 1C is adopted to provide a uniform rule on signatures and to expand the types of permissible signatures, primarily to allow for lawyers to "sign" documents electronically and to direct another attorney or an assistant to place a signature on a document. It is modeled on provisions from existing Rule 7A(g)(1) and from Pandemic Management Order PMO-SJC-2(G) (as amended December 14, 2020). It has four subdivisions. Subdivision (a) permits a signature to be placed on a document by methods other than the traditional handwritten, or "wet ink," signature. A person may sign a document by physically signing the document by hand (as always), by incorporating an image of a handwritten signature, or by typing "/s/" followed by the person's name. Filers should note that a mere "/s/," without a typed name following the signature, is insufficient. For example, a signature might be "/s/ Jane Smith." Subdivision (b) sets out the requirements for the "signature block" following a signature. The signature block must contain the listed information about the person whose signature appears on the signature line. Each client must be named; an indication that the attorney is the "Attorney for appellants" is not sufficient. If more than one attorney from a single firm signs the document, the common information need not be repeated. For example, the signatures and signature block on a document filed by two attorneys on behalf of three appellants should take this form: Respectfully submitted, /s/ Andrea Attorney Andrea Attorney Maine Bar No. 11111 aattorney@attylawyer.com /s/ Lawrence Lawyer Lawrence Lawyer Maine Bar No. 22222 llawyer@attylawyer.com Attorney & Lawyer, LLC 100 Main St Anytown, Maine 04999 207-555-5555 Attorneys for John Doe, Jane Roe, and Charlene Client Subdivisions (c) and (d) set out the effect of a signature, similarly to M.R. Civ. P. 11(a).

Advisory Notes to former Rule 2 of the Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure [The 2017 restyling of the Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure separated former Rule 2 into three individual rules covering Notice and Filing of Appeal (Rule 2A), Time for Appeal (Rule 2B), and Multiple Appeals and Bonds in Civil Cases (Rule 2C). The Advisory Notes for Adoption of and Amendments to former Rule 2, because they relate to a single Rule, could not be separated into

Advisory Notes applicable to one of the three new Rules. Therefore, the

Advisory Notes to the former Rule 2 are added at this point. They should be reviewed when seeking to examine the history, prior to restyling of the three new Rules. Note: Amendments to former Rule 2(a) generally relate to restyled Rule 2A; amendments to former Rule 2(b) generally relate to restyled Rule 2B; and amendments to former Rule 2(c) generally relate to restyled Rule 2C. Sometimes one paragraph in the Rule 2 Advisory Notes may relate to amendment to more than one subdivision of former Rule 2.]

Advisory Note – August 2015 Because of the adoption of the Maine Rules of Unified Criminal Procedure, effective throughout the State of Maine as of July 1, 2015, all references and citations to the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure have been replaced with references and citations to the Maine Rules of Unified Criminal Procedure. All references to the Maine Revised Statutes Annotated in the Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure are updated to refer to the Maine Revised Statutes.

Advisory Note – October 2012 The amendment [to Rule 2(a)(5)] is a technical change to recognize the new title for what is now called the Office of Transcript Production.

Advisory Note – July 2012 Rule 2(a)(1) and (4) and Rule 2(b)(3) are amended to make clear the need for payment of the filing fee in those appeals for which a filing fee is required. This requirement is also discussed in M.R. Civ. P. 5(f).

Advisory Note – November 2011 Rule 2(c)(3) is clarified to indicate that, unless the parties agree or it is ordered otherwise, the first party to file a notice of appeal is the "appellant" and all others are "appellees." The former rule referred to "both" parties, leaving uncertainty as to how to interpret the rule when there were more than two parties in the case. The rule is also amended to indicate that if both parents appeal from an order impacting both parents' parental rights in a child protection, guardianship, or grandparents' visitation proceeding, both parents are treated as appellants, unless otherwise ordered.

Advisory Notes – January 2004 This amendment to M.R. App. P. 2(b)(5) establishes two time periods within which a party may seek an extension of time to file an appeal. Subparagraph (A) allows the court to extend the time period for filing an appeal for up to 21 days from the expiration of the original time limit for filing an appeal–usually 21 days from entry of judgment–upon a showing of good cause. This is the time period for an extension of time specified in the current rule. Subparagraph B allows the court to extend the time period for filing an appeal for up to 140 days (20 weeks) from the expiration of the original time limit for filing an appeal–usually 21 days from entry of judgment–upon a showing of the three criteria indicated in subparagraph B. The extension of time provisions in subparagraphs A and B are in the alternative and are not cumulative. Both start running from the expiration of the original time limit for filing an appeal. The purpose of this amendment to M.R. App. P. 2(b)(5) is to provide greater flexibility to courts to extend time for filing a notice of appeal, particularly in instances where the clerk has not sent a copy of the judgment to the parties or otherwise notified the parties that judgment has been entered. To accomplish this objective, two changes are adopted. First, the standard for review for requests to extend time in paragraph A is changed from "excusable neglect" to "good cause." The good cause standard is viewed as one which is more lenient than the excusable neglect standard. See M OORE'S F EDERAL P RACTICE (3d. 2002), section 304.14[2][a] (excusable neglect) and [b] (good cause). It is the same standard that is applied in M.R. Civ. P. 55(c) for setting aside defaults. Second, the rule change in subparagraph B allows an extension of the time to file a notice of appeal exceeding 21 days, but not exceeding 140 days, from the expiration of the original time for filing an appeal, for those cases where the moving party demonstrates that the clerk failed to send notice of entry of judgment to the parties. The moving party is also required to demonstrate that they did not otherwise learn of the entry of judgment and that any other party will not be unfairly prejudiced by the requested extension of time. This amendment gives the court some flexibility to mitigate the potentially harsh affects of a failure to notify parties of entry of a judgment which, under appellate practice, was not allowed to be considered in evaluating a motion to extend time. Bourke v. City of S. Portland , 2002 ME 155, 806 A.2d 1255; Harris Baking Co. v. Mazzeo , 294 A.2d 445, 451 (Me. 1972). These changes, however, recognize the importance of the finality of judgments. A time extension would be barred if the moving party had otherwise learned of the entry of the judgment or if any party would be unfairly prejudiced by allowing the after the deadline appeal. Notably, claims of lack of receipt of notice would be insufficient to justify an extension of time under this rule amendment. Some failure of action in a clerk's office must be demonstrated. The Committee recognizes that claims of lack of receipt of notice may be a frequent excuse for sloppy record keeping, poor office management, inattentive litigation practices or failures to keep a court and litigants aware of changes in addresses. It should also be noted that the exception relating to the failure of the clerk to send notice would only be generated in cases where the clerk was obligated to send notice of entry of judgments. This exception would not be generated, therefore, in situations such as entry of default judgments, where the clerk may have no obligation to send a copy of the judgment to a litigant who has failed to appear or otherwise plead in a matter.

Advisory Notes – July 2003 This amendment to M.R. App. P. 2(b)(2)(B) recognizes the change in the time limit for filing an extradition appeal adopted by P.L. 2003, ch. 17, §§ 1 & 2, enacting 15 M.R.S.A. § 210-B, setting the time limit for filing an appeal at 7 days after entry of order. The prior law specified a 10-day time period.

Advisory Notes – October 15, 2001 Rule 2(b)(2) is amended to recognize 15 M.R.S.A. § 210-A(2) which requires that any appeals from orders entered in extradition proceedings be filed within ten (10) days of entry of the order appealed from. This amendment is necessary in light of the addition to the Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure of rules governing discretionary appeals including appeals of extradition orders which are being moved from the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure into Rule 19 of the Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Advisory Notes – September 10, 2001 The Rule 2, subdivision (a), paragraph (2) amendment adds a crossreference to the statement of issues requirement of M.R. App. P. 5(b)(2)(A) which must be included with civil notices of appeal. The amendments to Rule 2(b), based on the recommendation of the Court Unification Implementation Committee, and authorized by P.L. 2001, ch. 17, create a uniform appeal filing deadline of 21 days after entry in the docket of the judgment or order appealed from, unless a different time is explicitly provided by law. This change adds one day to the present 20-day limit for filing criminal appeals, and reduces by nine days the present 30-day limit for filing civil appeals. The amendments are intended to further the intent of the original CUTAF legislation to improve appeal processing times. The changed dates apply to appeals of judgments or orders entered on and after January 1, 2002. The amendment to subdivision (c), paragraph (3), clarifies the Court reference in the rule.

Advisory Notes – January 1, 2001 Rule 2(a)(1) is based on provisions of M.R. Civ. P. 73(a) & (b) and M.R. Crim. P. 37(a) & (b). It provides in essence that review of any judgment, order, or ruling of the trial courts shall be by appeal to the Law Court where that judgment, order, or ruling is by law reviewable by the Law Court. The appeal must be commenced by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken. Accompanying the notice of appeal must be a transcript order form for those portions of the transcript that the appellant intends to include in the record on appeal. The notice of appeal and transcript order form must be signed by the appellant or the appellant's attorney. Rule 2(a)(2) is based on a portion of M.R. Civ. P. 73(b). It continues the present requirement that the notice of appeal specify the parties taking the appeal and designate the judgment or other court order from which the appeal is being taken. This specific requirement is now extended to criminal cases. Rule 2(a)(3) & (4) involve special provisions for criminal appeals, derived from the last paragraph of M.R. Crim. P. 37(b) and the last paragraph of M.R. Crim. P. 37(c). Paragraph (3) adopts the present requirement of M.R. Crim. P. 37(c) that, upon imposing any sentence after trial, or after a plea to murder or a Class A, B or C crime which involves a sentence that was not agreed to by the defendant, the court must advise the defendant of the rights of appeal of both the underlying conviction and the sentence. The sentence appeal advice must be given only if the sentence involves a term of imprisonment, either underlying or imposed, of more than one year. See 15 M.R.S.A. § 2151. Where a criminal defendant is not represented by counsel and requests that a notice of appeal be filed, the court clerk is to prepare and file a notice of appeal on behalf of the defendant. The requirement imposed on the clerk is necessarily limited to the notice of appeal, as the clerk would have no basis to make any determination regarding the appropriate nature of any transcript to be ordered with a transcript order form. Paragraph (4) of the rule reflects the statutory requirement of 15 M.R.S.A. § 2115-A(5) that any appeals by the State in criminal cases, except postconviction case appeals, must be approved, in writing, by the Attorney General. The approval must be filed with the clerk of the trial court and noted on the docket. A copy must be mailed by the clerk to the attorney for the defendant, or, if the defendant is unrepresented, directly to the defendant. Rule 2(a)(5) is based on a portion of M.R. Civ. P. 73(b) and M.R. Crim. P. 37(b). It requires that, once the notice of appeal is filed, the clerk must date stamp it and mail a copy of the notice of appeal and transcript order form to the Clerk of the Law Court, the court reporter or Electronic Recording Division, and the attorney of record for each party to the appeal other than the appellant. Where a party is not represented by an attorney, the clerk fulfills the duty of sending a notice of appeal to that party by sending the notice to the last known address of the party appearing in the court file. In cases arising under the Maine Tort Claims Act, the clerk must send a copy of the notice of appeal to the Attorney General at the same time that the clerk sends copies of the notice of appeal to other parties in the action. Subdivision 5 also recognizes that a clerk's failure to send a notice of appeal, required by this section, does not affect the validity of the appeal. Notice to a party is sufficient when mailed by the clerk regardless of the death of the party or the party's attorney prior to sending of the notice. The clerk is to note in the docket the names of the parties to whom copies of the notice of appeal were mailed and the date of mailing. Rule 2(b)(1) states that the date a judgment is deemed to be entered for purposes of this rule and for calculating the time periods for filing an appeal, is the date on which the judgment is entered in the docket. If the date appearing on the judgment is different from the date of docketing, the date of docketing controls. This reflects current requirements as stated in M.R. Civ. P. 58 and M.R. Crim. P. 37(c). A notice of appeal filed at an earlier time, after a verdict or an order or other action of the court, but before entry of that judgment or other order in the docket, is treated as filed on the day of entry into the docket. Rule 2(b)(2) governs the time for filing appeals in criminal cases. The notice of appeal must be filed within 20 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from in the docket unless a shorter time is provided by law. See 15 M.R.S.A. § 2115 (Supp. 1999). The rule reflects current M.R. Crim. P. 37(c) in providing a list of exceptions that allow delay of filing of the notice of appeal until 20 days after entry of a ruling on the listed motions, provided that the motion at issue is itself filed within 20 days after entry of judgment. The deadline for filing a notice of appeal is not stayed unless one of the specifically listed motions is filed within 20 days after entry of judgment. Rule 2(b)(3) governs the time for filing notices of appeal in civil cases. This rule is based on M.R. Civ. P. 73(a). Notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from except where a shorter time is provided by law. See 14 M.R.S.A. § 1851. If one party to a civil case files a timely notice of appeal, any other party to the case may file a notice of appeal within 14 days of the date on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within 30 days after entry of judgment, whichever time expires last. As with the criminal rules, the time for filing an appeal is stayed by one of the listed motions if the motion itself is filed within § 2115. Appeals from the Superior Court In any criminal proceeding in the Superior Court, any defendant aggrieved by a judgment of conviction, ruling or order may appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court. The time for taking the appeal and the manner and any conditions for the taking of the appeal shall be as the Supreme Judicial Court provides by rule. In any civil case any party aggrieved by any judgment, ruling or order may appeal therefrom to the law court within 30 days or such further time as may be granted by the court pursuant to a rule of court. the time specified for filing the motion. Where such a motion is filed, the time for filing appeal begins to run from entry of the order ruling on the listed motions. Thus, if a specific enumerated motion is filed within the time required for filing the motion, or within the appeal period if no time period is set for the motion, the time for filing an appeal is extended to 30 days after an order ruling on the indicated motion. Rule 2(b)(4) states that an appeal taken from a judgment including an appeal taken after entry of an order on a post-judgment motion as addressed in 2(b)(2) and 2(b)(3) allows review of any properly preserved claim of error in the original record or any orders entered based on post-judgment motions. The rule also clarifies that filing of motions and entry of subsequent orders does not render a previously filed notice of appeal ineffective. Appeals designated as being taken from orders on post-judgment motions are treated as appeals from the judgment itself. This provision is based on similar language in M.R. Civ. P. 73(a) and M.R. Crim. P. 37(c). Rule 2(b)(5) is derived from M.R. Civ. P. 73(a) and M.R. Crim. P. 37(c). It allows the court, on a showing of excusable neglect, before or after a particular appeal deadline has expired, to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal otherwise allowed for a period not to exceed 21 days from the expiration of the original time prescribed in this rule, 20 days for criminal appeals and 30 days for civil appeals. The 21‐day additional period is a change from current rules which allow an additional 30 days in both criminal and civil cases. Rule 2(c) adopts provisions that are carryovers from the present appeal rules without any significant change in language. Rule 2(c)(1) carries over present Rule 73(c). Rule 2(c)(2) carries over present M.R. Civ. P. 73(d), and Rule 2(c)(3) carries over present M.R. Civ. P. 73(e). The provisions of 2(c) are only applicable to civil cases. Note that bail for criminal appeals is governed by M.R. Crim. P. 46 which is not affected by these amendments.