Chapter 6 · Article VI. Witnesses

Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime

Amended 2025 (current) Contains Deadlines

Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime.

(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,

(1) (A) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and

(B) evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and

(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.

(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction, more than ten years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence.

(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or equivalent procedure. Evidence of a conviction is admissible under this rule even if the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or equivalent procedure.

(d) Juvenile or youthful offender adjudications. Evidence of juvenile or youthful offender adjudications is not admissible under this rule.

(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render evidence of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible.

Committee Notes

Advisory Committee’s Notes Alabama Rule of Evidence 404(a) recognizes the general exclusionary rule under which evidence of a person’s character is inadmissible to prove action in conformity therewith on the particular occasion being litigated. Rule 404(a)(3), however, carves out an exception to this general rule excluding evidence of character. Whenever a witness takes the stand and offers testimony, evidence of the witness’s character for untruthfulness may be admitted as a basis from which to infer that the witness is not telling the truth. This opens the door to any character evidence that is relevant to credibility. Rule 609 serves as an example of such impeachment. Section (a). General rule. The preexisting Alabama statutory provision authorizing impeachment by evidence showing conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-162(b), has been superseded by Rule 609. Under Rule 609, there will be alternative tests: one based upon the seriousness of the crime, met only if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, and the other based upon whether the crime involved dishonesty or false statement. This rule is based upon Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) as amended January 26, 1990, effective December 1, 1990. The special balancing test embodied in Rule 609(a)(1)(B) is to be applied only to the criminal defendant who testifies in the criminal case in which he or she is being prosecuted. Crimes involving “dishonesty or false statement,” as indicated in the report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary during the process of adopting the corresponding Federal Rule 609, include crimes “such as perjury or subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement or false pretense, or any other offense, in the nature of crimen falsi the commission of which involves some element of untruthfulness, deceit, or falsification bearing on the accused’s propensity to testify truthfully.” Senate Comm. on Judiciar