Rule 407. Subsequent remedial measures

Subsequent remedial measures. When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, measures are taken that, if taken previously, would have made the injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product, a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning or instruction. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment. [Amended 8-15-2013, eff. 10-1-2013.]

Committee Notes

Advisory Committee’s Notes This rule, in its adoption of the historic “subsequent remedial measures doctrine,” calls for the general exclusion of evidence of remedial measures when it is offered to prove antecedent negligence or other culpable conduct. Based upon both a policy of encouraging safety measures and a consideration of irrelevancy, this general exclusionary rule is deeply rooted in the law of Alabama and the United States. See, e.g., Columbia & Puget Sound R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202 (1892); Frierson v. Frazier, 142 Ala. 232, 37 So. 825 (1904); Hyde v. Wages, 454 So.2d 926 (Ala.1984); Banner Welders, Inc. v. Knighton, 425 So.2d 441 (Ala.1982). See also C. Gamble & G. Windle, Remedial Measures Doctrine in Alabama: From Exclusion to Admissibility and the Death of Policy, 37 Ala.L.Rev. 547 (1986); C. Gamble, McElroy’s Alabama Evidence § 189.02 (4th ed. 1991). As under the reasoning at work in such principles as those incorporated into Ala.R.Evid. 404(b) (excluding evidence of prior criminal misconduct by an accused), Ala.R.Evid. 408 (excluding evidence of offers of compromise), and Ala.R.Evid. 411 (excluding evidence of liability insurance), evidence of subsequent remedial measures is excluded only when it is offered for the impermissible purpose of proving either negligence or other culpable conduct. A party may circumvent the general rule of exclusion by offering the evidence for some permissible purpose, such as impeachment or to prove ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if the thing to be proved is controverted. As indicated by the phrase “such as,” these purposes stated are not a complete listing. Several of the purposes mentioned in this rule have been recognized under preexisting Alabama law. See Holland v. First Nat’l Bank of Brewton, 519 So.2d 460 (Ala.1987) (control); Alabama Power Co. v. Marine Builders, Inc., 475 So.2d 168 (Ala.1985) (feasibility); Stauffer Chem. Co. v. Buckalew, 456 So.2d 778 (Ala.1984) (impeachment